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ABSTRACT: Semantic theories predict that the dimension for
comparison given a sentence like A gleebed more than B depends
on what the verb gleeb means: if gleeb expresses a property of
events, the evaluation should proceed by number; if it expresses
a property of processes, any of distance, duration, or number
should be available. An adequate test of theories like this requires
first determining, independently of language, the conditions under which people will understand a novel verb to be true of a
series of events or a single ongoing process. We investigate this
prior question by studying people’s representation of two cues in
simple visual scenes: a) whether some happening is interrupted
by temporal pauses, and b) whether and how the speed of an
object’s motion changes. We measured representation by probing people’s choice of verb in free-form descriptions of the scenes,
and how they segment the scenes for the purposes of counting.
We find evidence that both types of cues shape people’s representation of simple motions as events or processes, but in different
ways.
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INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and semanticists often assume a tight connection between
language and the world: that our words and sentences directly relate
to the things and happenings that we want to talk about. Psychologists, in contrast, typically suppose that the language-world connection
is inextricably mediated by the mind: that systems of perception and
conception shape our experience of things and happenings, and these
representations are directly encoded by language. The tripartite connection between language, mind, and the world is important, because
there are many ways of representing, and talking about, the same thing
or happening. For example, imagine that a cat and a mouse run in a
circle: if we think of the cat as agent, the scene is better labeled using
the verb chase; if we think of the mouse as agent, flee is better. This paper is part of a larger project drawing explicit links between language
and representation in the visual domain.1
Research at the interface between nominal syntax and visual representation has uncovered tight interconnections between labeling and
how people view a scene. To get a feel for the influence of language
on visual thinking, we might imagine some red confetti-like material
sorted into a blue-and-white striped container. If the scene is labeled
using a novel noun in count syntax (e.g., a sib), people prefer to think
that the intended referent is the striped container; in contrast, given
mass syntax (e.g., some sib), they prefer to think it is the red material
(Brown 1957). For the influence of visual representation on language,
notice that people prefer to describe a regularly-shaped novel entity
using count syntax (e.g., There is a blicket), but an irregularly-shaped
entity using mass syntax (e.g., There is blicket; e.g. Prasada et al. 2002).
Such case studies reveal an alignment between the psychologist’s ‘object’ representations (see Rips & Hespos 2015), and the semanticist’s
‘atomic reference’ for count syntax (cf. Link 1983; Gillon 1992, 1999):
whatever x counts as N given a N, x cannot be arbitrarily divided into
more instances of N.
Semantic theory has described parallel commitments for the semantics of verb phrases at least since Vendler (1957), but connections with
representation have been relatively underexplored in cognitive psychology (though see Lakusta & Wagner 2016). The distinction on the language side is usually couched in terms of ‘telicity’ (see e.g. Dowty 1979,
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Krifka 1989): VPs that include information about a bound, end, or telos are called telic predicates (e.g., run to the park); VPs that do not
include such information are called atelic predicates (e.g., run in the
park). Telic predicates have been likened to count predicates in requiring that their satisfiers be ‘atomic’, while atelic predicates (like mass
predicates) are neutral in this respect (e.g. Taylor 1977; Bach 1986).
Distributionally, telic predicates may be differentiated from atelic predicates in whether they can, for example, describe a single ‘happening’
measured for its duration (A ran in the park for an hour, *A ran to the
park for an hour). With respect to atomicity, arbitrary divisions of a
single running to the park clearly won’t divide into other instances of
running to the park, just like a single container generally won’t divide
into other containers.
Using appropriately constrained scenes, a clear alignment between
count syntax and object representation, and between mass syntax and
substance representation has been observed (see above). But what
about the hypothetical alignment between telic syntax and event representation, and between atelic syntax and process representation? Some
experimental evidence already supports a parallel language-to-mind direction of influence in this domain. Given identical scenes involving
two objects moving up and down on a screen, a sentence like A jumped
more than B leads to comparison by number (suggesting event quantification; cf. Barner et al. 2008), but a sentence like A moved more
than B leads to comparison by duration or number (suggesting process
or event quantification; Wellwood et al. 2019). Consistent with these
observations, Wellwood et al. (2018b) found that people preferred to
label a series of dynamic movements using count syntax if the movement was broken up at non-arbitrary temporal intervals, but to label
the same movement with mass syntax if it was broken up at arbitrary
temporal intervals.
These distinctions matter. Most importantly for the semanticist’s
purposes, without an independent grasp on the categories of representation that people deploy when viewing a scene, certain theories will be
untestable. For example, Wellwood et al. (2012) suppose that the dimension along which a comparative sentence like A gleebed more than
B will be understood depends on the ontological category that gleeb
applies to: if it applies to events (i.e., if gleeb is telic), the dimension
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should be number; if it applies to processes (i.e., if it is atelic) the dimension can be freer. To test the predictions of a semantic theory that
depends on ontological distinctions like this, we must have an independent, empirically-motivated grasp of the ontology. In particular, we
must be able to say under what conditions a scene is likely to be viewed
in terms of a series of events as opposed to an ongoing process.
We take up this issue in the current paper. A better understanding of
people’s perception of dynamic visual scenes in event or process terms
will not only place us in a better position to evaluate semantic theories
that depend on this distinction, but it may ultimately help to determine
why we should observe the parallels that we do between the nominal
and verbal domains. We focus on two features as potential cues that
may shape people’s perception of motions in highly-constrained visual
scenes: the inclusion or absence of arbitrary temporal breaks (cf. Wellwood et al. 2018b,a), and constancy/change of speed (cf. Zacks 2004).
And we assess perception in two ways: by evaluating people’s choice
of predicates (telic vs. atelic) in their descriptions of the motions, and
their strategies in segmenting the continuous motion.
As we will show, our experimental results reveal a surprising asymmetry between how people choose to label our simple scenes, and how
they count. People’s labeling preferences are sensitive to whether or not
arbitrary breaks are included (our operationalization of the ‘atomicity’
feature in the formal semantics literature), while their counting preferences are sensitive to whether or not the object undergoes a speed
change (a feature found to be important in the event perception literature). This asymmetry raises new questions about the relationship
between linguistic and conceptual encoding, as well as about the relationship between categorization and counting.
1.1.

Potential cues: Evidence from semantics and cognitive psychology

What cues in the visual scene could potentially be used to distinguish
events and processes? We consider two which strike us as intrinsic to
the ontological distinction. The first cue—whether an object’s movement is divided into arbitrary temporal slices or not—is invited by consideration of differences between telic and atelic reference. The second cue—whether the velocity of a moving object undergoes a distinct change—can be found in the event representation literature. (In
Vol. 13: Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language
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the next section, we will consider another potential candidate, namely
whether or not there is a change in the direction of movement; since we
take this cue to be extrinsic to the core distinction between event and
process, and since the presence/absence of this feature will not distinguish our scenes, it is best addressed in the context of discussing cue
validity.)
The first cue—inclusion/absence of arbitrary temporal breaks—is
derived from the formal semantics literature, and some initial results
linking that literature with properties of visual representation (e.g. Wellwood et al. 2018b). Predicates may or may not refer divisively: atelic
predicates are divisive, while telic predicates are non-divisive. The difference may be detected in the intuitive validity of certain simple inference patterns. For example, the VP push a cart is a classic atelic
predicate, in virtue of its licensing the inference in (1). In contrast,
the VP draw a circle is telic, in virtue of its failing to license the corresponding inference, (2). In Vendler’s (1957) terms, the atelic predicate
describes a ‘process’, any arbitrary part of which is of the same type as
the whole, while the telic predicate describes an ‘event’, arbitrary parts
of which are not of the same type. Such data have, thus, been taken
to suggest that processes may be divided at arbitrary temporal points
and still instantiate that same process (e.g., a division of some moving is
still moving), whereas events are different (e.g., a division of a jumping
may simply be a rising up, a coming back down, or other non-jumps).
(1)

Sally was pushing a cart, but then she stopped.
→ Sally pushed a cart.

(2)

Sally was drawing a circle, but then she stopped.
6→ Sally drew a circle.

Wellwood et al. (2018b) offered some initial, indirect evidence for
the validity of arbitrary/non-arbitrary division as a cue towards categorization in terms of events versus process. Their experimental participants viewed simple motions that were temporally divided either at arbitrary or non-arbitrary points, and were asked how they would prefer
to describe what they saw. They had two sentential options, each containing a novel deverbal noun (cf. Barner et al. 2008): a count syntax
option (e.g., The star did some gleebs), and a mass syntax option (e.g.,
The star did some gleebing). Following many authors, Wellwood et al aswww.thebalticyearbook.org
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sumed that the choice of count syntax would indicate categorization in
terms of events. And indeed, they found that trials with non-arbitrary
divisions led to a preference for count syntax, while those with arbitrary
divisions led to a preference for mass syntax. This evidence counts as
indirect for our purposes in two respects: it used noun rather than verb
syntax to probe event representation, and it presented participants with
a forced choice between two sentences (though see Wellwood et al.
2018a). Stronger and more direct evidence would come from participants’ spontaneous descriptions, and in particular, their verb choices.
In light of the previous results, however, we hypothesized that the inclusion of arbitrary temporal breaks would make scenes appear more
process-like than event-like.
The second cue—changes in speed—is derived from recent evidence
in cognitive psychology.2,3 Zacks (2004) asked participants to segment
continuous motions involving two objects, and examined the effect of a
series of movement features (e.g., relative position, distance, momentary speed, speed change) on participants’ willingness to indicate where
meaningful boundaries should be placed within those motions—i.e.,
event boundaries. Forward-stepwise regression models revealed that
speed change is a salient feature reliably predictive of segmentation
(and, thus, of meaningful boundaries between events). He manipulated speed change in a continuous manner, varied by pre-defined equations; here, we draw upon speed change to make a potentially categorical difference between events and processes. We hypothesized that:
all else equal, a motion lacking any changes in speed would be more
likely to be perceived as a process, while a motion with speed changes
is likely to be perceived as a series of events—specifically, events whose
boundaries align with the points at which the speed changes.
It is worth noting, though, that the possibility of imposing ‘extrinsic’
bounds on what is intrinsically represented as a process will make the
interpretation of segmentation behavior somewhat tricky. To get a feel
for this, consider a difference in the interpretive patterns of telic/eventive
jump and atelic/process move combined with measuring vs counting
modifiers as in (3) and (4). While (3a) is odd if intended to describe
a single occasion of jumping, it is fine if intended to describe a series
of jumps, for example those numbering 17, (3b). (4a) is different: it is
most naturally interpreted as describing a single ongoing activity. How-
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ever, ongoing activities like this can be bounded, and counted; this is
what is required for (4b). In such cases, what counts as a bound is
contextually-determined; the verb’s descriptive content doesn’t tell us.
(3)
(4)

1.2.

a.

A jumped for an hour.

b.

A jumped seventeen times.

a.

A moved for an hour.

b.

A moved seventeen times.

Evaluating perception: verb choice & segmentation strategy

How can we assess people’s perception of visual scenes? Visual representations are not, of course, directly accessible to us. But some indirect
measures can often lend us important insights (see, for example, Wellwood et al. 2015, who measured participants’ judgments of the similarity between two events and their reaction times as ways to evaluate
event perception). Here we describe two ways that we think will provide some of the best indirect evidence for that perception (cf. Wolff
2003): the choice of main verb used to describe a scene, and where
that scene is segmented into countable units.
For verb choice, we draw again on parallels with the mass/count
distinction in the nominal domain, which is commonly recruited to detect representation in object versus substance terms.4 Here in the verbal
domain, the relevant linguistic distinction is, again, that between telic
and atelic predicates. Telic predicates are importantly ‘atomic’ and,
just like count predicates, provide the right semantic environment to
support counting as opposed to measuring (see the previous subsection). Telic verb phrases like fall asleep or jump are directly acceptable
and interpretable with modifiers that imply counting (three times) and
non-overlap (over and over), but not with those that imply measures
of temporal duration (for an hour), at least not for a single instance of
the happening. Atelic predicates like sleep and move show the opposite
patterning.
Thus, a more direct measure than the forced linguistic choice used
in previous studies like Wellwood et al’s (2018b) is to ask how people
choose to describe a scene. In particular, drawing on the languageperception connection observed in the nominal domain, we can ask
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people to describe what they see, and use their choice of predicate to
infer their representation of that scene. To the extent that their verbal
descriptions differ in interesting ways, this is a reasonable first step towards inferring properties of their representations of what happened.
Specifically, we hypothesized that the selection of telic verbs would reflect representation of a simple dynamic scene in ‘event’ terms, whereas
the selection of atelic verbs would indicate representation in ‘process’
terms. If the two cues to eventhood proper that we outlined in the
previous section are accurate—i.e., inclusion of arbitrary pauses, speed
changes in an object’s movement—then we would expect to see an increase in telic over atelic language just when those cues are present.
In addition to language choice, how people segment a continuous
motion for the purposes of counting should also reflect any cleavage between event and process representation. Events are intrinsically countable units, unlike processes. And indeed, it has been shown that people
quantify scenes highly suggestive of ‘events’ in terms of number, even at
a very young age. Wood & Spelke (2005) showed that infants could discriminate large numbers of jumps (i.e., four vs. eight), and cared about
the number of jumps even when it was de-confounded with their extent
along other continuous dimensions. Moreover, this intrinsic countability might be revealed by tracking things like changes in speed in an
otherwise continuous motion (Zacks 2004). Processes, lacking any intrinsic bounds that would support counting, can nonetheless figure in
counting behavior; motion that is perceived primarily in ‘process’ terms
can be segmented according to extrinsic boundaries such as a change
of location or direction (cf. Magliano et al. 2001). For example, imagine an object moving at a continuous rate back and forth on a screen.
Nothing inherent to the movement suggests meaningful units for the
purposes of counting, but the boundaries of the screen might provide
salient points of segmentation regardless. Therefore, how people segment the scene may provide important cues to how they are representing ongoing motions.
In our experiment, we display simple motions occurring within certain spatial boundaries (i.e., two edges of a computer screen), which
may serve as default segmentation points, independently of categorization in terms of event or process. This would manifest in our experiment
as counting as ‘one’ any left-to-right crossing of the screen by the ob-
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ject. Such a segmentation strategy could mean one of two things: an
intrinsic categorization in ‘event’ terms, or one in ‘process’ terms with an
extrinsic bound. Thus, we are particularly interested in deviations from
this default. We anticipated, in particular, that people might consider
the total motion on a given trial as a single segment (thereby indicating
process categorization; with extrinsic spatial boundaries); they might
consider a movement across the screen and back as a single segment
(thereby indicating event categorization; something like a jump); and
of course, on trials with arbitrary pauses, they might consider a movement bounded by those temporal pauses as a unit (thereby indicating
process categorization, with extrinsic temporal boundaries).
In short, choices of segmentation points that are different from the
default will likely come from people’s perception of event boundaries,
some of which are intrinsic (reflecting core ‘event’ categorization) and
some of which are extrinsic (built atop core ‘process’ categorization).5
2.

EXPERIMENT

In this experiment, we aim to uncover what kinds of visual information
will make people think of a happening as either an event or a process.
2.1.

Participants

Participants were 60 adults recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. Each were paid $1 for 6 minutes of participation.
2.2.

Design

In our experiment, participants saw simple animations and answered
two questions for each animation. This section provides an overview of
the study design, and the next section provides more details about the
features of our animations corresponding to these manipulations.
The basic format of each of our animations consisted of a square
object moving from one edge of the computer screen to the other and
back, some number of times. Differences between the animations resulted from the manipulation of two factors, corresponding to the two
visual cues that may influence categorization in terms of events vs process. The between-subjects factor Pauses manipulated to whether or
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not there were temporal pauses in the object’s movement (i.e., Pause,
No Pause). The within-subjects factor Movement Type (i.e., Constant,
Smooth, and Sharp) manipulated whether and how the speed of the object changed during a given animation. The Constant movement type
involves no speed changes—thus representing, plausibly, a good candidate for process representation, while both Smooth and Sharp did
involve speed changes—thus, plausible candidates for event representation. Smooth and Sharp differ only in whether their change in acceleration was graduated (Smooth) or stepped (Sharp), as we describe in
more detail in the next section. We manipulated this visual difference
as it might correspond to a difference in the size of the hypothetical
events: intuitively, Smooth invites thinking about the composite of a
back and forth motion as ‘one’, while Sharp invites about each single
crossing this way.
Following each animation, participants were asked two questions
in turn: (i) “what happened?” and (ii) “how many times?” For (i), we
chose neutral phrasing that would induce as little bias as possible in
the participants’ freeform responses. Responses to this question could
be coded for many different linguistic features, but we focus specifically
on the question of whether their main verb choices were telic or atelic.
A response headed by a telic verb signaled, for us, event categorization,
and one headed by an atelic verb signaled process categorization. For
(ii), the semantics of the question we chose imposes the need for some
degree of segmentation of the continuous motion stream into units,
while leaving it up to the participant just what should be counted. Ideally, responses to this question would be a count of how many times
something matching their description happened. We coded these responses as compatible with one of two segmentation strategies—by the
number of screen crossings (henceforth: by crossings) or by the number of back-and-forth movements (i.e., a 2 crossing chunk; henceforth:
by back-and-forths).6
2.3.

Predictions

We investigate two possible cues to event versus process representation.
We hypothesized (i) that the inclusion of arbitrary temporal breaks
would render a scene a better candidate for process over event categorization, and (ii) that sharp changes in speed are more likely to
Vol. 13: Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language
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be viewed as indicating meaningful, intrinsic event boundaries. These
hypotheses support a couple of clear predictions in light of our study
design.
In terms of the description portion of the task, regarding (i) we
would expect more uses of atelic verbs (e.g., move) in the Pause conditions over the No Pause conditions, and the reverse for uses of telic
verbs (e.g., bounce). Regarding (ii), we would expect more uses of atelic
verbs for the Constant movement type but more uses of telic verbs for
the Smooth and Sharp movement types.
In terms of the counting portion of the task, we can first describe
some general expectations, and then potential interactions with Pause/No
Pause. First, the Smooth movement type features no stepped speed
changes, but the graduated change might suggest event boundaries
at the start/finish points; if so, we would expect more ‘by back-andforth’ segments. For Constant and Sharp, we might expect more ‘by
crossings’ counts, but for different reasons: hypothetically, Constant
provides no intrinsic event boundaries, and so segmentation behavior
should track extrinsic features like the screen edges; in contrast, Sharp
involves speed changes at exactly those points, and so is intrinsically
bounded there. At the same time, we expect the Pause condition to
make people more likely to view the scene in process terms, yet those
pauses may also serve to impose extrinsic temporal boundaries; thus for
this condition we might expect (a) more ‘by crossing’ counts, reflecting
greater process categorization; or (b) more counts ‘by back-and-forths’,
reflecting a greater salience to left-edge boundaries. The results regarding this point will thus lend us some insight on the role of extrinsic
boundaries on people’s representation of the scene, especially when intrinsic boundaries are lacking.
2.4.
2.4.1.

Stimuli
Movement types

Each animation in our experiment depicted a red square on a light blue
background, instantiating one of our three movement types. These are
represented schematically in Figure 1. Each schematic marks a single
back and forth for each movement type, and highlights whether and
where a speed change occurs. The relative distance between the arrows
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and the size of the shaded region behind those points redundantly indicate the relative speed at which the object moved at a given point in
time.
constant

smooth

sharp

Figure 1: Static depictions of the three movement types. Arrows represent the direction
of movement, the width of the shaded band represents relative duration.

The Constant movement type animated the object at a constant
speed as it traversed the screen back and forth. Given the constant
pace, there was no indication as to event boundaries; if this movement
type is to be segmented, extrinsic properties like the screen edges would
have to be attended to. The Smooth movement type animated the object speeding up on its left-to-right trajectory, and then slowing down
as it returns from right-to-left. We reasoned that the gradual change in
velocity at the right edge would not invite perception of an event boundary, but the whole back-and-forth (much like a jumping or a bouncing)
might. Hence, the Smooth movement type was designed to elicit events
of a larger grain-size than the Sharp movement type, which featured a
sharp change in speed at the right edge: the stepped change in speed
for the Sharp animations should, we reasoned, lead to greater segmentation at the right edge.
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Number of crossings, and pauses

A number of instances of each of our three movement types were programmed, corresponding to different numbers of total crossings, and
whether the animation included temporal pauses. For each movement
type, animations were included in which the square completed either
6, 10, or 18 crossings (viewed another way: 3, 5, or 9 back-and-forths).
Furthermore, each of these animation types came in No Pause and Pause
variants.
In the No Pause conditions, the square simply traversed the screen
according to the number of crossings programmed for that trial. In the
Pause conditions, the square would occasionally pause when it returned
to the left edge. The number of times the object paused depended on
the number of crossings on that trial. To see how we determined this in
detail, consider Figure 2, which displays the number of possible pause
locations at the left edge, corresponding to any left-edge appearance of
the square except for the first and last in the animation. Thus, the 6
crossing animations made two pause locations available, the 10 crossing animations made four available, and the 18 crossing animations
made eight available. In an initial round of programming, we made it
so that the square would pause randomly at half of the possible pause
locations available given the number of crossings.
However, running the experiment online rendered it infeasible to
include every animation corresponding to every combination of n crossings and n/2 pauses.7 Instead, for each animation instantiating n crossings, we selected two n/2 Pause variants that the experiment script
would randomly select between for a given trial. For the animations
with 6 crossings, we included the two possible variants: one where the
object pauses only at the first possible pause location, and one where
the object only pauses at the second possible pause location. For the
animations in which the number of crossings was higher, we chose the
animations in which the object paused at points either maximally close
to the start/end points, or maximally far from those endpoints. For
10 crossing animations, the pause patterns were either the 1st and 4th
pause locations, or the 2nd and 3rd pause locations. For 18 crossings,
the object paused either at the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 8th locations, or at
the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th locations.
Because the object’s trajectory would be paused only at half of the
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Figure 2: Possible pause locations for 6 crossings (left), 10 crossings (center), and 18
crossings (right). Pink squares mark the start and finish points in the animation. Red
squares mark possible pause locations; the number within the square keeps track of the
accumulated number of ‘back-and-forths’. Each crossing is represented with an arrow,
the numbers on the right side of the arrows keeps track of the accumulated number of
crossings.

possible pause locations, and because the ‘size’ of the activity thus divided would be non-uniform, we expected that the inclusion of pauses
would appear more as arbitrary pauses in an otherwise continuous activity stream, and thus should be more suggestive of process over event
categorization.
2.5.

Procedure

The animations for our experiment were programmed using PsychoPy
(Peirce et al. 2019). Selected animations, as described in the preceding section, were then screen-recorded using QuickTime. These animations were called upon by an experiment script written in jsPsych
(de Leeuw 2015). After an initial instructions screen, participants began one of 9 trials total (3 for each of the movement types, at each of
the 3 numbers of total crossings), followed by debriefing screens. The
instructions screen indicated the questions they would be asked, and
that they would enter their responses into text boxes following each
animation; they were furthermore instructed to use their number keys
for the second question.
The trial structure can be seen in Figure 3. Each trial consisted of
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3 parts: one animation, followed by each of our two questions in turn.
Upon completion of the animation, the screen automatically shifted
to the first question response screen. This question read, “What happened?”, and was paired with a text box. Upon completing their freeform description entered into that box, participants clicked a button
to advance the next question screen. This question read, “How many
times?”, and was paired with another textbox. Following this, participants again clicked a button, which at this point would start a new trial
or lead to the debriefing screens.

Figure 3: Trial structure for the experiment.

2.6.
2.6.1.

Results
Coding

All responses were coded and inspected for general patterns by the third
author.
For the first question, “What happened?”, there were many features
of the responses that one could investigate; we focused on the use of
telic versus atelic main verbs, and so-classified them according to their
infinitival forms. Three verbs accounted for almost 97% of responses:
bounce (33.7%), move (45.3%), and go (17.6%). Given the very high
proportion of uses of bounce and move, and given their clear instantiation of opposition in the telic-atelic space,8 we will focus our analyses
on the subset of trials in which these verbs were produced.
For the second question, “How many times?”, we were interested
in whether the number reported corresponded to the total number of
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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crossings on that trial, or to the number of back-and-forths. For these
counts, we considered responses within ±1 to be consistent: e.g., for 18
crossings, we would allow a response of “17” to count as consistent with
segmentation based on total crossings. We did this as it seemed reasonable to allow for some small margin of error in participants’ counts, or in
their recall of those counts, since their responses to this question were
recorded after a second, separate screen, and after their responses to
the “What happened?” question.
We report the results of our analyses of responses to each of these
two questions in turn.
2.6.2.

“What happened?”

We first analyzed participants’ uses of move—a typical process verb, and
bounce—a typical event verb. Out of 540 trials (60 participants, 9 trials
each), move was used on 248 trials (45.3%) and bounce on 205 trials
(33.7%)—these included 13 trials where both verbs were used; on 123
trials, neither was used.

Figure 4: The effect of inclusion of arbitrary temporal pauses on descriptions using
bounce and move.
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For each verb, we coded use of that verb as 1 and non-use as 0.
Data for move and bounce were then each entered a mixed-effect logistic regression model, with Pauses (pause vs. no pause) and Movement
Type (constant vs. smooth vs. sharp) as fixed effects, and participant
and participant-by-movement as random effects. The models indicated
a marginally significant effect of Pauses for both move (parameter estimate = 3.86, z = 1.95, p = .052) and bounce (parameter estimate
= −5.10, z = −2.89, p < .01); but the directions of difference were
opposite (see Figure 4)—move was used more in the Pause condition
(57.0% of all trials) than in the No Pause condition (34.8%), whereas
bounce was used more in the No Pause condition (48.1%) than in the
Pause condition (19.3%).
No effect of Movement was found (all ps > .20; Figure 5). These
results suggest that the inclusion of arbitrary temporal pauses had a
strong effect on verb choices, which reflects people’s event perception,
over and above the contribution of different patterns of movement—
specifically, the inclusion of arbitrary temporal pauses made all movement types more likely to be viewed in process rather than event terms.

Figure 5: The lack of differentiation between different types of movement patterns on
descriptions using bounce (telic/eventive)and move (atelic/process).

Paired t-tests revealed that in the Pause condition, for all three movewww.thebalticyearbook.org
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ment types, move was used significantly more than bounce (all ps <
.05); but in the No Pause condition, move usage was on a par with
bounce usage for all movement types (all ps > .238; see Figure 6). This
further corroborates the above point—that the inclusion of arbitrary
temporal pauses makes a scene more likely to be viewed in process
terms.

Figure 6: The effect of arbitrary temporal pauses on bounce (telic/eventive) and move
(atelic/process) production is independent of the type of motion depicted.

2.6.3.

“How many times?”

We then analyzed participants’ segmentation strategy—by the number
of screen crossings, and by the number of back-and-forth movements
(i.e., half the number of crossings). Out of 540 trials (60 participants, 9
trials each), segmentation was consistent with number of crossings on
250 trials (46.3%) and with number of back-and-forths on 180 trials
(14.8%); and on 110 trials neither strategy was used.
For each counting strategy, we coded use of that strategy as 1 and
non-use as 0. Data for ‘by crossings’ and ‘by back-and-forths’ were then
each entered into two mixed-effect logistic regression models, one with
Pauses (pause vs. no pause) as the fixed effect and participant as a
random effect, the other with Movement Type (constant vs. smooth
vs. sharp) as the fixed effect and participant as a random effect. The
Vol. 13: Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language
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models indicated a main effect of Pauses for the ‘by crossings’ strategy
(parameter estimate = −1.59, z = −2.66, p < .01) and a marginally
significant effect of Pauses for ‘by back-and-forths’ (intercept parameter
= 1.30, z = 1.91, p = .057); but the directions of difference were opposite (see Figure 7)—‘by crossings’ was used more in the No Pause condition (56.7% of all trials) than in the Pause condition (35.9%), whereas
‘by back-and-forths’ was used more in the Pause condition (41.5%) than
in the No Pause condition (25.2%).

Figure 7: The effect of inclusion of arbitrary temporal pauses on segmentation ‘by
crossings’ versus ‘by back-and-forths’.

Our models also indicated main effects of Movement Type. First,
the Constant and Smooth movements elicited different uses of counting strategy. Specifically, Constant yielded more ‘by crossings’ strategy than Smooth (parameter estimate = 0.83, z = 3.01, p < .01),
but less ‘by back-and-forths’ (parameter estimate = −1.15, z = −3.57,
p < .001; Figure 8). Second, there was also a difference between Sharp
and Smooth: Sharp yielded less ‘back-and-forths’ strategy than Smooth
(parameter estimate = −0.70, z = −2.25, p < .01); it went the opposite
direction for ‘crossings’ but the difference was not significant (parameter estimate = −.40, z = 1.46, p = .15).
These results suggest two points. First, the inclusion of arbitrary
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Figure 8: The effect of different movement patterns on ‘by crossing’ versus ‘by backand-forth’ segmentation.

temporal pauses has a strong effect on people’s choices of segmentation strategies—specifically, these pauses elicit more ‘by back-andforths’ counting and less ‘by crossings’ counting. Second, the movement type (varying in velocity changes) also affects people’s segmentation strategies—specifically, Constant elicits more ‘by crossings’ counting and less ‘by back-and-forths’ counting, in comparison to Smooth.
Our results are consistent with the prediction that the Constant movement is more reflective of a process and the Smooth movement of events.
But the pattern with the Sharp movement is unclear.
Paired t-tests revealed that in the Pause conditions, ‘by crossings’
and ‘by back-and-forths’ were used equally for all movement types (all
ps > .32; see Figure 9). In the No Pause conditions, however, with
Constant and Sharp, ‘by crossings’ was used significantly more than ‘by
back-and-forths’ (p < .001 and p < .01, respectively), yet there was
no difference between them with Smooth (p = .36). These results further corroborate the two points made above: that the lack of arbitrary
pauses lead to more use of ‘crossings’ and less of ‘back-and-forths’, and
that Constant and Sharp patterned together, differently from Smooth.

Vol. 13: Events and Objects in Perception, Cognition, and Language

21

Alexis Wellwood et al.

Figure 9: The effect of arbitrary temporal pauses on ‘by crossings’ versus ‘by back-andforths’ segmentation strategies, by movement type.

3.

DISCUSSION

We asked: under what conditions do people view a simple motion as a
series of events versus an ongoing process. In particular, we considered
the role of two potential cues: a) the inclusion/absence of arbitrary
temporal breaks, and b) the constancy/change of movement speed.
A two-part experiment evaluating participants’ verb choices and segmentation strategies reveals the following main findings with respect
to these two cues.
For the first cue, the effect of arbitrary temporal breaks is seen on
both verb use and segmentation strategy choices. Specifically, people
used more atelic verbs in the Pause conditions and more telic verbs
in the No Pause conditions, consistent with our prediction. However,
people’s by-crossing counts decreased in the Pause conditions but byback-and-forth counts increased, inconsistent with our prediction. We
speculated that this is because the points for arbitrary pauses are always
at the left edge of the screen, making back-and-forth segments more
salient.
For the second cue, the effect of speed change (and thus movement
types) is observed only with segmentation strategy, but not with verb
choice. The lack of effect on verb use, we speculate, is because in verbal
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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description, people focus more on the abstract structure of the motions
(as semanticists have tuned to), paying less attention to concrete differences in speed. People’s segmentation strategy choices were largely
consistent with our predictions; specifically, for Constant, they counted
by crossings, as predicted for a process; for Smooth, they counted by
back-and-forths and crossings, a mixture of event and process indications; and for Sharp, they counted by crossings, as predicted for events
with boundaries at both the left and right edges.
However, these results also show a surprising asymmetry: the inclusion of arbitrary temporal pauses increases the appropriateness of
process categorization (as indicated by a preference for labeling with
atelic move), but the inclusion of changes in velocity did not decrease
this preference (as indicated by the lack of effect of our factor Movement Type on move/bounce labeling). In a certain respect, these results
suggest a disconnect between categorization and counting: labeling,
as an indicator of categorization, tracks factors identified in formal semantics (cf. Wellwood et al. 2018b); counting, as an indicator of segmentation, tracks factors identified in cognitive psychology (cf. Zacks
2004). One might have thought that counting was made possible by
and depended on one’s prior choice of category (cf. Koslicki 1997).
The results also raise a number of questions that should be addressed in follow-up research. For one thing, the present study did
not contrast the inclusion of arbitrary versus non-arbitrary pauses, as
Wellwood et al. (2018b) did. Based on the previous research, use of the
present methodology would lead us to expect to see that the inclusion
of non-arbitrary pauses would have the opposite effect (increasing the
choice of telic verbs) to that we observed for arbitrary pauses in the
present experiment. For another, it may be preferable to eliminate the
extrinsic boundaries inherent in our animations (the screen edges) in
favor of, for example, circular paths, as this could help decouple any
effect of pauses from the effect of location changes. And of course, one
will want an account of how the low-level features studied here relate
to the higher-order features characteristic of more complex, real-world
events (cp. Levine et al. 2017).
Finally, to the extent that we have established firm footing in a real
cognitive distinction between events and processes, it would be useful
to use materials like those we have devised in an extension of the type of
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task used by Barner et al. (2008) with the object/substance distinction.
They presented participants with novel stimuli that were independently
determined to cue object versus substance categorization, labeled the
stuff with a novel noun, and showed how the ontological distinction
made in perception affected quantification with comparative more. In
light of the present evidence, we would expect for novel gleeb more that
the quantification would be more likely to proceed along a continuous
dimension, so long as arbitrary pauses are included in whatever movement pattern participants are exposed to. In contrast, it would be more
likely to proceed by number when the arbitrary pauses are not included.
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Notes
1
We occasionally talk of ‘perception’ rather than ‘representation’; for the purposes of
the present paper, the two terms are used interchangeably.
2
This literature does not explicitly consider the distinction of interest here, namely
between events and processes as such. Rather, it focuses on the parameters by which
ongoing activity is likely to be segmented into a series of discrete events.
3
Many other factors have been explored with respect to event segmentation, for example the perceived intentions or goals of actors involved in a scene (see Levine et al.
2017 for recent discussion and citations). We are concerned with very simple scenes
lacking entities that are likely to be perceived as intentional, deliberately setting aside
consideration of such ‘higher-order’ features.
4
That is, when people are presented with simple scenes that minimally afford these
ontological categories as options for the extension of a novel noun. We do not assume
that mass syntax implies the substance category, for example (cf. furniture-type nouns).
Count syntax, though, does carry semantic commitments towards ‘atomicity’, or nondivisiveness of reference. We take it that people’s representations of concrete objects
satisfy such a requirement, but not that count syntax itself implies concreteness, etc.
5
This characterization corresponds, in the linguistic domain, to analyses in which
expressions properly ‘about’ processes can be embedded into larger expressions ‘about’
events; see Rothstein 1999, Wellwood 2016, among others.
6
For example, if the object crossed the screen 8 times, this would correspond to 8
crossings but 4 back-and-forths. Our coding allows for some wiggle room in the counts;
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see §2.6.2.
7
The animations were generated dynamically onsite, but needed to be screen-recorded
and uploaded to the internet for the mturk study. Without being selective, we would have
had to do this hundreds of times. It seemed to us that the trimmed version described in
the text would be sufficient for our purposes.
8
Roughly following the methodology in Barner et al. 2008, we conducted a norming study on mTurk to determine the telicity status of 213 intransitive verbs (Wellwood
et al. 2019). We did this by inquiring about whether a given V, used in a frame like “A
V’ed all day”, could describe a single happening (durative/process interpretation), or if
it must repeat in a series of discrete happenings (iterative/event interpretation). By this
measure, bounce received an interativity/event score of 93.3%, while move received an
iterativity/event score of 16.7%.
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